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Introduction 
The debt crisis that hit the eurozone last year forced 
European leaders to develop new solutions to deal 
with the crisis. These solutions have been dominated 
by the idea that sanctions should be imposed 
everywhere in the system. Thus, European leaders are 
tightening up the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
and are imposing stiffer sanctions on governments 
that do not obey the rules. Bondholders who have the 
temerity to buy government bonds will face sanctions 
in the form of haircuts when governments get into 
payment difficulties. The financial rescue mechanism 
aimed at providing liquidity to distressed 
governments carries punitive interest rates. Thus 
Ireland was subjected to an interest rate of close to 6% 
for the financial assistance it received from the EFSF.  
In this paper I argue that too much emphasis was put 
on designing punishment mechanisms to deal with the 
crisis, and to prevent future ones. I will then ask the 
question why so much emphasis was put on 
punishment. Finally, I will argue that a greater role 
should be given to forgiveness, and I will discuss 
what that means in practice.  
In order to analyse whether punishment is the right 
approach, it is useful to make a distinction between 
the proposed means of punishment of governments 
and the punishment of private market participants. Let 
us concentrate on the latter first.  
Punishing private agents 
The threat of punishment of private market 
participants leads to two problems. First, it works 
only when these agents know they are doing 
something wrong that is subject to punishment. If they 
are not aware that they are committing an offence, the 
threat of punishment will not discipline them. During 
the good years prior to the crisis, few people realised 
that they were doing something wrong that would 
lead to punishment. Private investors were blinded by 
euphoria and did not see the risks. Bankers took 
excessive risk because they massively underestimated 
it. This underestimation had two dimensions. First, 
bankers underestimated the risk on their own balance 
sheets and second, they did not take into account the 
systemic risks they created by over-leveraging. They 
were driven to do this by the sense of euphoria that 
infused the bubble and boom periods and that blinded 
almost everybody, including the supervisors, from 
seeing the risks. So having the punishment would not 
have changed their behaviour.  
For the same reason, introducing tighter punishments 
and penalties to be applied in the future will not 
prevent crises. In the future, agents will do things that 
may lead to a crisis without being aware that they are 
doing something punishable. This is likely to happen 
with the next bubble, when doom and gloom has 
dissipated and euphoria takes over again.  
The second problem with punishments is that they 
lead agents to run for cover when punishment is 
imminent. This running for cover is easy in financial  
2 | Paul De Grauwe 
markets. Investors just sell. But if this selling is done 
collectively, it triggers the crisis that the threat of 
punishment was supposed to avoid. In other words, 
punishment has very little disciplinary effects on 
financial markets, because if investors are quick 
enough they know they can avoid punishment. In 
addition, this running for cover can in fact trigger a 
crisis where none would have occurred without the 
punishment scheme.  
This idea can be applied to the proposed bail-in 
mechanism that will be attached to future sovereign 
bond issues in the eurozone. At the insistence of 
Germany, the European Councils of October and 
December 2010 decided to make future financial 
assistance to eurozone governments conditional on 
making sovereign bondholders pay in the form of 
haircuts. Thus, eurozone governments have 
announced that sovereign bondholders will be 
punished in the future for the sins of the sovereigns.  
This announcement has a double effect. First, it makes 
sovereign bonds riskier and therefore increases the 
interest rate. Second, and more importantly, it 
destabilises the government bond markets in the 
eurozone for the reasons explained above. The threat 
of punishment now hangs over the sovereign bond 
markets in the eurozone, which will have the effect of 
regularly inducing bondholders to run for cover. They 
will do this each time they expect future payment 
problems in one of the eurozone governments. But 
this running for cover will in turn make a default 
crisis more likely. When investors sell their bonds, the 
interest rate goes up, thereby increasing the risk of 
default, which in turn triggers more selling. This self-
fulfilling mechanism will make the government bond 
markets more fragile and volatile. In fact this has 
already happened since the decisions made by the 
European Council in October and December 2010 
(see De Grauwe, 2010) where this fragility is 
compared with the fragility of the ERM that existed 
prior to the start of the eurozone). Thus, the idea 
derived from moral hazard thinking that somebody 
must be punished has a disastrous effect. Instead of 
solving a problem, it creates a new one.  
Punishing governments 
The other major solution proposed by the European 
leaders is to tighten up the SGP, i.e. to have a stronger 
punishment scheme for governments. This 
prescription is based on the same moral hazard 
thinking and will certainly not solve the debt crisis. It 
even risks making it worse.   
There are two reasons why tightening the rules of the 
SGP is the wrong answer to the sovereign debt crisis. 
The first one is that with the exception of Greece, the 
other eurozone countries (Ireland, Spain) were not 
pulled into a debt crisis because of an excessive 
public debt accumulation prior to the crisis. The 
government debt crisis in most eurozone countries has 
nothing to do with undisciplined government 
behaviour prior to the crisis, but with excessive risk-
taking by the private sector. If the tighter SGP rules 
now being implemented had been applied before the 
crisis, they would not have made a difference in most 
of these countries (with the exception of Greece). 
Governments like Ireland and Spain would have 
passed these tighter rules with flying colours; yet they 
would not have escaped the subsequent crisis.  
The second reason why the tighter SGP rules will not 
work has to do with the political economy of these 
rules. As long as budgetary policies (spending and 
taxation) remain vested in the hands of national 
governments and parliaments, the political 
responsibility for the decisions about spending and 
taxation rests with these national governments and 
parliaments. The latter face political sanctions by 
national electorates. Neither the European 
Commission nor the other members of the Council 
face political sanctions for the measures they impose 
on one member country. The principle of “no taxation 
without representation” lies at the heart of democracy. 
The SGP has been an attempt to short-circuit this 
principle, by giving powers to individuals and 
institutions that do not face the political consequences 
of their actions. Such an attempt has to fail and 
happily so.  
This is also the fundamental reason why the French 
and German governments decided in 2003 to ignore 
the then prevailing fiscal rules. They were urged by 
the Commission to overhaul their spending and 
taxation decisions. But the Commission did not face 
the sanctions of the French and German electorates; 
the French and German governments did. Each time 
such a situation occurs in the future (and provided the 
countries concerned are sufficiently large and 
powerful) it is the European Commission that will 
lose the battle.  
The European policy-makers believe that the Stability 
and Growth Pact can be made to work by stiffening 
the rules. But, surely, stiffer rules and sanctions will 
not help to salvage the SGP, which is deeply flawed 
because it disregards elementary political principles.  
Bad design of financial assistance 
The idea that punishment should be part of the cure to 
the debt crisis has also infected the design of the 
financial assistance in the eurozone. The EFSF that 
was instituted during the Greek debt crisis in May 
2010 has been forced to provide financial assistance 
to Greece and Ireland at punitive interest rates. The 
interest rate applied to the Irish loans now amounts to 
almost 6%. This high interest rate has a very 
unfortunate effect. First, by charging this high interest  
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rate it makes it more difficult for the Irish government 
to reduce its budget deficit and to slow down debt 
accumulation. Second, by charging a risk premium of 
about 3% above the risk-free rate that the German, 
Dutch and Austrian governments enjoy, the EFSF 
signals to the market that there is a significant risk of 
default, and thus that the Irish government will not 
succeed in putting its budgetary house in order. No 
wonder that financial markets continue to harbour 
their distrust and also charge a high-risk premium. All 
this, in a self-fulfilling way, increases the risk of 
default. It is quite sad that the EFSF that was created 
to solve a problem contributes to creating one.  
The intelligent approach to financial assistance 
consists of using a policy of the carrot and the stick. 
The stick is the conditionality, i.e. an austerity 
package spelled out over a sufficiently long period of 
time, so that economic growth gets a chance. Without 
economic growth, debt burdens cannot decline. The 
carrot is a concessional interest rate that makes it 
easier for the country concerned to stop debt 
accumulation. A low interest rate also expresses trust 
in the success of the package – trust that financial 
markets need in order to induce them to buy the 
government debt at a reasonable interest rate. I will 
come back to this point. 
This intelligent approach was not followed. Why is 
this? Why has the idea that punishment should meted 
out become so important in the design of mechanisms 
to deal with the crisis? My answer is that the 
punishment idea has been much influenced by the 
idea that the crisis was caused to a large extent by 
moral hazard. 
Is the debt crisis the result of moral hazard? 
Moral hazard can be defined as additional risk-taking 
by agents who believe they are insured against the 
risk they take. Applied to the sovereign debt crisis in 
the eurozone, moral hazard means that some 
governments have issued too much debt in the past, 
expecting other governments to bail them out. In the 
context of the banking crisis, moral hazard arose 
when bankers were taking excessive risks also 
because they expected governments to bail them out.  
There is a strong popular perception today that the 
core of the sovereign debt crisis is moral hazard. This 
is especially the case in Northern Europe. Many well-
known economists in these countries have stressed the 
irresponsible behaviour of governments of peripheral 
countries as the root cause of the crisis and have 
warned that providing financial assistance will induce 
these governments to remain irresponsible (see Sinn, 
2010). This view has dominated the popular press in 
countries like German and the Netherlands. As a 
result, the popular sentiment in these countries has 
very much turned against financial assistance for 
‘irresponsible governments’. This popular sentiment 
has been very influential in shaping the official 
German and Dutch policies. It is therefore important 
to once again analyse the question of whether the debt 
crisis is the result of moral hazard.  
Let’s consider the debt problems of Ireland and Spain 
(I’ll turn my attention to Greece later). The 
government debt ratios in these two countries 
declined dramatically prior to 2007. When the bank 
crisis erupted, the governments of these countries 
were forced to rescue the banks and to sustain 
economic activity. The effect was that the government 
debt exploded in these countries. Under no stretch of 
the imagination can one interpret these events as 
being the result of moral hazard. The Spanish and 
Irish governments did not increase their debt because 
they expected to be bailed out by Germany or any 
other country. They did this because any government 
responsible for the welfare of its people would have 
done the same. There was no other available option 
except to let the economy and the market system in 
these countries implode.  
Proponents of the moral hazard diagnosis may object 
here, by noting that even if the governments’ actions 
were not driven by moral hazard, the latter was at the 
core of the banking crisis that forced the governments 
to intervene. Thus, ultimately the cause of the crisis is 
moral hazard: banks took excessive risks because they 
expected to be bailed out by their respective 
governments. This interpretation does not make sense 
either. It is true that bankers took excessive risks. But 
not because in the back of their mind they had this 
idea that their governments would rescue them. Top 
management of the banks could not possibly have 
hoped that governments would bail them out, as such 
a bailout operation could have cost them their heads. 
As argued earlier, they took excessive risk because, 
for various reasons, they massively underestimated it.  
What about Greece? No doubt, there was a lot of 
irresponsible behaviour of successive Greek 
governments. But to think that these governments 
were spending excessively because they expected 
Germany to bail them out is far-fetched. It had 
everything to do with a weak political system that fell 
prey to pressures of domestic interest groups trying to 
obtain part of government largesse. In this process, 
politicians like bankers and many others, were swept 
up by the euphoria produced by (unsustainable) 
growth rates. The latter created the perception that the 
sky was the limit. 
Surely there was misbehaviour of many actors in this 
drama. When interpreted in the light of moral hazard, 
it leads to the conclusion that punishment is necessary 
because it has the salutary effect of changing 
incentives. It teaches a lesson that should prevent 
those who have sinned from sinning again. And it  
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teaches a lesson to the others who have not sinned 
that bad behaviour will be sanctioned. 
The need for forgiveness 
Too much emphasis has been put on the idea that 
governments and private market participants should 
be subjected to sanctions. I have argued that these 
sanctions will not work in preventing future crises. 
Worse, when applied to private market participants 
(e.g. sovereign bond holders), these sanctions will 
trigger crises more often than they will prevent them. 
When applied to the design of financial assistance, 
these sanctions make it more difficult to stop the debt 
accumulation, thereby prolonging the crisis. 
The solution of the debt crisis must be sought not in 
systematic punishments of governments and private 
market participants. More emphasis should be put on 
a willingness to be forgiving. The main reason is that 
this is in the interest not only of the debtor but also of 
the creditor nations. Let me develop this point further, 
beginning with the figures presented in Table 1. I 
show the primary surplus that is needed to stabilise 
the government debt ratios in different problematic 
eurozone countries. Let us assume that the debt level 
these countries aim to stabilise at is the likely level 
that will be reached at the end of 2011. The interest 
rate that is applied in this calculation matters a great 
deal. I use two opposite scenarios. In one scenario I 
apply the present punitive interest rate used by the 
EFSF, which is close to 6%. In the second scenario, I 
assume that the EFSF would apply a ‘gentle’ interest 
rate, i.e. 3.5%, which is the interest rate paid by 
Germany on its debt plus some ‘gentle’ risk premium 
of 0.5% (so as to ensure that the creditor nations do 
not lose out). Thus, this scenario takes the view that 
the appropriate interest rate is the one that is 
approximately free of default risk.
1 In both scenarios I 
assume a zero growth rate of GDP. Thus, I assume 
away any improvement of the debt ratio coming from 
economic recovery.  
The contrast between the two scenarios in Table 1 is 
striking. When the punitive interest rate is used (6%), 
the fiscal effort needed to stabilise the debt ratio is 
considerable, leading to the question whether these 
problem countries will be able or willing to make this 
effort. In the second scenario using the gentle risk-
free interest rate, the fiscal effort required to stabilise 
the debt ratio is considerably reduced. Countries like 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain are clearly capable of 
making that effort, and thus they are capable of 
                                                      
1 These interest rates are of course hypothetical. The actual 
interest rate on the outstanding debt of these countries 
today is different. The point is that interest rates on the debt 
would tend to converge to the interest rates set by the 
EFSF. Thus in Table 1 we look at the long-run solvency 
requirement under these two interest rate scenarios. 
avoiding default, making the gentle interest rate 
applied to lending to these countries a self-fulfilling 
one, i.e. one that avoids default. It is unclear whether 
this also holds for Greece, where we see that applying 
the gentle interest rate will still require a considerable 
fiscal effort in that country. In addition, in the case of 
Greece, this effort stabilises the debt ratio at 145% of 
GDP, which can be considered to be unsustainable in 
the long run. Thus for Greece other solutions will 
have to be considered, i.e. debt restructuring.  
Table 1. Primary surplus needed to stabilise 
debt ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The previous calculation illustrates that there are 
several possible equilibria. There is a nasty 
equilibrium. This is the equilibrium obtained in the 
punitive scenario with a high interest rate that in a 
self-fulfilling way increases the default risk in all 
countries concerned and thus keeps the interest rate 
high. There is a gentle equilibrium in which the lower 
interest rate reduces the fiscal effort needed to 
stabilise the debt ratio. By having a greater probability 
of success, this scenario leads to a lower default risk. 
The gentle interest rate produces a gentle equilibrium 
with a low interest rate. This gentle equilibrium is in 
the interest of both the debtor and the creditor nations.  
Achieving this gentle equilibrium, however, is only 
possible if the creditor nations commit themselves to 
providing liquidity. They have the means to do so. 
The only possible obstacle is a political one. It will 
require convincing the German, the Dutch (and a few 
other) populations that it is indeed in their national 
self-interest to commit themselves to financial 
assistance.  
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